The Social Medium: Why the Authentication Bar Should Be Raised For Social Media Evidence
Volume 87, Online
By Colin Miller, Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law [PDF]

Tiffany Parker’s trial started and ended with Facebook. On December 2, 2011, Parker fought with Sheniya Brown over Facebook messages regarding a mutual love interest.[1] Later that night, Parker allegedly posted entries on her Facebook page containing content such as “bet tht [sic] bitch didnt [sic] think [I] was going to see her ass . . . bet she wont [sic] inbox me no more, #caughtthatbitch.”[2] After the jury rejected Parker’s claim of self-defense and convicted her of second-degree assault, the sole basis for her appeal was that the prosecution failed to properly authenticate the Facebook entries as ones she had authored.[3]

In addressing the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that courts have applied two conflicting approaches regarding the authentication of social media evidence. Most courts apply a traditional authentication standard based on the assumption “that the risk of forgery exists with any evidence.”[4] Other courts, however, impose a higher authentication bar based on forgery concerns unique to social media evidence.[5] This Essay argues against the majority approach and in favor of a more stringent authentication standard for social media evidence.

* Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Blog Editor, EvidenceProf Blog: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/.

** Student, University of South Carolina School of Law; J.D. expected, 2015.

[1]. Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 683 (Del. 2014).

[2]. Id. at 684.

[3]. Id.

[4]. Id. at 686.

[5]. Id.